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1. Introduction 
Whilst the origins of international relations (IR) as a discipline are deeply intertwined with 
historical reflection, the contemporary dominance of positivism in mainstream IR – often 
accused of being ahistorical – has nonetheless coincided with a renewed attention to the 
intellectual linkages between history and IR.1 This enduring disciplinary dialogue, which began 
with the so-called “second great debate” between behaviouralism and the historically-inspired 
English School,2 is not just a response to the growing trend in favour of post-positivist 
epistemology throughout the social sciences; it is also a consequence of the continuing use of 
historically rich case studies to construct and test IR theory.3 This dialogue has notably led to 
calls to close the gap – methodologically and epistemologically – between the two disciplines4 
as well as helped specify the continuing divergence between the respective fields of inquiry in 
terms of the past being of interest in itself to historians as compared with the need to produce 
general theories within IR.5 However, this dialogue has proceeded with insufficient comparative 
reflection on how the disciplines consider what historical knowledge is useful for i.e. how they 
think historically or are historically conscious. The tendency in mainstream IR theory – as seen 
by the influence of Thucydides within classical realism – is to treat history as instructive, that is, 
as a repository of historical data from which lessons can be learned. This treatment has meant 
overlooking the fact that historiography has long been divided in terms of what is here termed 
“historical consciousness”, referring to the way that historians view the writing of history as 
purposive without necessarily being instructive or lesson-based. This article seeks to highlight 
this division within history and explore whether or not this also exists within different traditions of 
thought in IR and, if so, what it reveals about the nature of the historical reflection underlying 
mainstream IR theory.  
In other words, the article argues that dialogue between history and IR can be furthered 
beyond clarification and improvement of the different ways of “doing history” in IR6 that impact 
upon epistemology, causal explanations, and the methodology of theory-testing. Such dialogue 
over “doing history” has already amply demonstrated the benefit of overcoming the supposed 
nomothetic/idiographic disciplinary divide;7 similarly, this literature has developed a powerful 
critique of ahistoricism in mainstream IR and rightly denounced the tendency to misuse history 
due to selection bias and limited interactions with primary sources.8 These preoccupations stem 
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from the modern debate between positivist and post-positivist epistemologies that exists in IR9 
but also in history, where historians clash over the writing of “correspondence” or 
“constructionist” histories.10 However, as this article shows, the debate over what historical 
knowledge is useful for – writing history as a political gambit rather than as a problem of 
methodology or epistemology – long predates this epistemological clash. It is for this reason that 
it is important to reconstruct how historiography has been divided in terms of what are called 
here different genres of historical consciousness. 
At the same time, there is a tendency to consider that the most productive 
interdisciplinary dialogue that IR can achieve must take place outside mainstream IR theory,11 
so that constructivism or the English School are better equipped to think critically about the 
nature of historical knowledge. It is certainly the case that constructivist theory, with its 
openness to multiple historical truths, is receptive to thinking about the historical record as 
something other than an independent store of knowledge about past events.12 The same is true 
for the English School, when seen in the light of William Bain’s call to treat history as an idea or 
a construction of particular practitioners in the present.13 However, this article aims to 
demonstrate that different mainstream traditions of thought in IR theory also think historically, 
especially in terms of specific genres of historical consciousness not limited to viewing history 
as instructive. The traditions of mainstream IR considered here – realism and liberalism 
(including the latter’s institutional variants)14 – can also be understood as paradigms, that is as 
sharing ‘incommensurable content with respect to some other paradigm’15. Following Jackson 
and Nexon, I separate these traditions around two axes or debates, namely: whether power 
politics can be tamed and whether anarchy is a fixed constraint on actors’ interactions. Hence 
the analysis problematizes how traditions in IR that accept or reject anarchy, as well as power 
politics, are conscious of the connection between past, present, and future.   
In particular, the article explores the extent to which both disciplines share similar genres 
of historical consciousness, looking specifically at whether history is understood as something 
other than instructive. What ultimately emerges from this comparison is the equally purposive or 
even political use of historical knowledge produced across both disciplines. Mainstream 
traditions of IR theory that argue power can be tamed, even if anarchy is still a fixed constraint, 
(such as democratic peace and neoliberal institutionalism) understand temporality by drawing 
lessons from history in a similar fashion to writers of history who treat the historical record as a 
teacher of experience. But just as there other are genres of historical consciousness in historical 
writing (history as representation, history as narrative), the realist tradition of thought that 
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centres around the constraint of anarchy and the impossibility of taming power also draws 
different conclusions about the nature of temporality and hence the purpose of historical 
knowledge. The broad umbrella of realism (classical and structural realism) looks at history 
purposively and sees strict continuity in the lesson it provides about the fixed constraint of 
anarchy, which makes power the dominant feature of international order. However, when 
examined in closer detail the realist tradition can also be seen to view history as having its 
revenge on attempts to organize inter-state relations in the vain hope that power can be tamed if 
correct lessons about the past are learned. Further demonstrating that this tradition – unlike 
liberalism – manifests different genres of historical consciousness, the progressive strand of 
realism is also examined to show that it speculates that there might even be a potential to 
escape from history.  
Uncovering this shared concern with producing historical knowledge for particular 
purposes based on historical consciousness – that is, how past, present and future are 
considered linked – can thus further the disciplinary dialogue beyond identifying common 
methodological and causal frameworks for grappling with historical data. A comparative 
examination of historical consciousness notably elucidates the way that despite attempts to 
distinguish social scientific theory-building from historical narratives or single case studies, both 
disciplines fundamentally rely on a purposive use of historical knowledge, based on a prior 
(often hidden) understanding of temporality. From this perspective, the supposed divide 
between idiographic history and nomothetic IR, or between chronicling and theory-building, 
masks the fact that both disciplines share not only the enterprise of reflecting upon the nature of 
temporality but also a concern with producing historical knowledge consistent with a particular 
and purposive understanding of history. Since both disciplines share this purposive 
understanding of historical knowledge, it becomes clear that the issue of how to “do history” in 
IR – i.e. how to adopt new methods or novel causal frameworks – needs to be complemented 
by a debate over how disciplines think historically. Consequently, as this article shows, there is 
a need for a more thorough engagement with a broader swathe of historiography as well as a 
recognition of the presence of different genres of historical consciousness across both 
disciplines. 
2. Engaging with Historiography and IR Theory through the Concept of Historical 
Consciousness 
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What is striking about the existing exploration of how to do history in IR is the 
overwhelming reliance on contemporary historiography. Diplomatic history and its offshoot 
international history have been fundamental sources of inspiration for IR scholars seeking to 
pursue disciplinary dialogue.16 Historical sociology17 and postmodern history18 have also been 
integrated into this endeavour, further complicating epistemological and methodological 
interaction in a way that profits from the post-positivist turn in both disciplines. However, 
historical reflection long precedes the Methodenstreit [conflict over methods] of the nineteenth 
century, when the German historian Leopold von Ranke and his followers sought to establish an 
objective science of history.19 IR scholars feel at home in the surroundings of modern history 
precisely because von Ranke’s movement opened up a long struggle over scientism and 
objectivist methodology analogous to that of the second (albeit contested) “great debate” in IR.20  
Nevertheless, the article argues, it is worthwhile to excavate a larger swathe of 
historiography in order to analyse the extent to which the disciplines share a common way of 
thinking historically, i.e. an understanding of how past, present and future are connected. 
Consequently, this article first examines the evolution of the canon of Western historiography 
prior to the attempted positivist turn heralded by von Ranke: a complex and rich body of 
historical knowledge. It does so in order to bring to light the surprising degree to which the 
development of historical knowledge has been characterised by competing notions of 
temporality. The latter are analysed as genres of historical consciousness because the notion of 
consciousness – the negotiation between subject and experience – is fundamental to historical 
understanding for, as Kratochwil explains, history ‘is the encounter with the self’.21 This 
negotiation gives rise to the phenomenon classified here as “historical consciousness”: the 
student of history’s awareness and understanding of the temporality of historical experience, the 
acknowledged consciousness of living in history. This is, therefore, a subjectivity or situatedness 
based on defining the nature of the relationship between past, present and future, which 
profoundly influences the production of historical knowledge. Indeed, historians’ work always 
evinces a (largely hidden) purposive concern to produce historical knowledge for certain ends 
as determined by the genre of historical consciousness they subscribe to. In this sense 
historians are not just “doing history” (dependent on methods or causal frameworks) but also 
consciously thinking historically, based on the purposive use of historical knowledge for certain 
ends.  
Scholars writing in the Western historical tradition have not shared a single notion of 
temporality and by implication there is no universal purposive project behind the writing of 
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history in the pre-positivist era. Each genre of historical consciousness captures a different way 
of understanding the nature of temporality and what it means for the purpose of producing 
historical knowledge. The article identifies, in section 3, the presence of three different genres in 
the canonical work of European historians since antiquity: history as teacher, history as 
narrative, history as representation. It is these three genres of historical consciousness that are 
then contrasted with the way that different notions of temporality are invoked across two long-
standing traditions of thought in IR: liberalism, with its rejection of power politics based on the 
belief in the taming effects of law and institutions, and realism, with its focus on the constraints 
of anarchy that make power the dominant factor of inter-state relations. The analysis in section 
4 thus examines the extent to which these traditions display a conscious reflection about 
temporality – the emplotted relationship between past, present and future. Despite certain 
attempts to problematize temporality in IR theory, notably by critiquing the very notion of using 
history as a didactic resource,22 the use of a comparative, cross-disciplinary perspective that 
juxtaposes historical consciousness across both disciplines is a novel mode of inquiry. Theories 
that are in essence methodological and epistemological critiques of positivism, such as 
feminism, constructivism, or relationism, are not included, however, as while they can be 
applied to explain processes of change these critical approaches do not contain an inherent 
notion of temporality. The English School is also excluded from the analysis because its 
principal exponents do not share a common understanding of how to treat history when 
theorizing about international order.23  
Analyzed according to their notion of temporality, the mainstream traditions of thought 
that differ over the constraint posed by anarchy and whether law or institutions can tame power, 
liberalism and realism, can be separated according to the genres of historical consciousness 
they espouse. Whereas liberalism in its different guises of democratic peace theory and 
neoliberal institutionalism adheres to the lessons of history genre, realism has a more complex 
relationship with history. Superficially, it manifests a sense that history has lessons, as both 
structural and classical realists point to an unbroken chronicle of power politics. However, both 
neorealism and classical realism rely on a less acknowledged genre, that of revenge of history, 
which suggests the immutable constraints of anarchy will shatter the best-laid projects of liberal 
institution-building. Yet the progressive tendency within classical realism, associated with the 
debate over the possibility of a world government, opens up the possibility of a third genre: 
escape from history, which identifies a fundamental caesura in the history of international 
relations that makes the present very much unlike the past, thereby implying that the future will 
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look very different. The difference between these two traditions, as well as the variance within 
realism itself, further demonstrates the value of exploring understandings of temporality across 
the disciplines of history and international relations. 
3. Genres of Historical Consciousness in Historical Writing 
Historical writing has a hugely complex historiography – the latter is itself a significant 
sub-discipline of history that dates back at least to Lorenzo Valla’s fifteenth-century exposure of 
the spurious nature of the donation of Constantine. Attempts to assign particular significance to 
different types of histories are controversial because of the absence of consensus over what (if 
anything) constitutes the canon of European historical writing.24 Not only are there multiple 
forms of historical writing, there are also myriad theories of historical causation since the 
historian’s craft of using sources by definition implies ‘a theory of possible history so that the 
sources might be brought to speak at all’.25 Similar issues arise when scholars of international 
relations have sought to draw on historical methods. However, the purpose of this article is not 
to inquire into theories about causation in history, a topic that has had a powerful influence on 
IR as discussed under the rubric of “doing history” above. Instead of focusing on debates over 
causation or the use of history, the overarching purpose in this section is to discuss the writing 
of history from the perspective of how notions of temporality (i.e. historical consciousness) have 
greatly influenced the type of history being written.  
From this viewpoint, the article develops a taxonomy of three genres of historical 
consciousness that pervade the works of historians prior to von Ranke: history as teacher, 
history as narrative, history as representation. The existence of these different genres is largely 
overlooked, at least in light of IR’s existing dialogue with history. This is because where IR 
scholars are conscious of the purposive dimension of historical writing it is overwhelmingly in 
terms of adapting the history as teacher genre for their own ends, leading to a neglect of how 
other genres of historical conscious treat the historical record. That is, the disciplinary dialogue 
in mainstream IR entails the use of history as a potential repository for lessons about how actors 
behave in international politics, mimicking the gambit of Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War in 
self-consciously treating the historical as an immortal or ‘an everlasting possession’.26  
Although very much divided over how exactly to make use of this supposedly eternal 
resource, IR theory has from the outset been adept at drawing on the historical record to test 
hypotheses and construct explanatory frameworks. This trend runs the gamut from classical 
realists’ use of Thucydides to explain pre-emptive conflict against hegemonic ambitions, 
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attempts to prove the democratic peace thesis by creating a comprehensive database of the 
conflicts undertaken by democratic regimes, to constructivists’ insistence on understanding 
actors’ propensity to change their practices or norms, which necessarily entails exploring the 
historical representations, justifications, or narratives deployed. But despite the parallels evinced 
here with a particular kind of historical writing – history as teacher – disciplinary dialogue still 
needs to distinguish between and reflect upon different understandings of temporality within 
historical writing.  
History as Teacher 
This genre situates historical knowledge in terms of its pedagogical, moral and practical 
use for the present and future. This particular form of historical consciousness sees the past as 
containing a source of enduring inspiration and example (positive and negative) that needs to 
be recorded and transmitted to posterity in the hope of emulation and enhanced self-knowledge. 
Cicero rendered this pedagogical approach as historia magistra vitae – history as the teacher of 
life. Another canonical formulation of this approach to temporality can be found in Bede’s 
prefatory dedication to his Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum: ‘if history relates good things 
of good men, the attentive hearer is excited to imitate that which is good’.27 
The history as teacher genre of historical consciousness, which uses historical 
knowledge for the purpose of education and example, continues to this day to leave its mark on 
historical writing. Despite the positivist turn in history, the lives of great individuals continue to be 
a source of inspiration containing moral and political lessons of leadership and decision-making 
applicable today.28 This trope is not, though, confined to recounting the story of great lives for 
the edification and improvement of generations present and future. A more disembodied take on 
this form of historical consciousness examines the shifting fortunes of nation-states, as captured 
in Kennedy’s Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1989),29 with its aim of educating readers 
about the factors that determine the fortunes of great powers and which can illuminate 
America’s predicament as sole superpower in the late twentieth century. Here again there is a 
classical origin to this approach of focusing on what the nations and regimes of the past can 
teach us about ineluctable cycles of success and failure in politics.30 
This emphasis on the cyclicality of events or on the enduring need to learn moral and 
political lessons through historical example shows why the history as teacher genre of historical 
consciousness should not be confused with the philosophy of history tradition. The latter seeks 
not to find appropriate lessons for current circumstances but to interpret the purpose or 
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teleology of historical development as manifested over a swathe of time. Perhaps most 
famously, this teleological interpretation was captured by Marx and Engels’ declaration in The 
Communist Manifesto that ‘the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class 
struggle’.31 It has remained in common currency thanks to Fukuyama’s32 claim that the demise 
of the Cold War was tantamount to the end of history given the supposedly unassailable triumph 
of liberal democratic values. This teleological tradition means looking at historical development 
‘from an absolute point beyond time’,33 since it precludes considering the driving force behind 
historical development as itself a historically contingent interpretation. Hence for present 
purposes, philosophy of history is not treated as a genre of historical consciousness here even if 
it has been a guiding inspiration behind historical, especially Marxist, scholarship.34  
History as Narrative  
The purpose behind the history as teacher tradition is to render the – always useful – 
past meaningful to aid in understanding the present and future predicament of individuals and 
states alike. By contrast, the aim of the history as narrative genre is principally to overcome the 
distance and separation between past and present whilst deliberately avoiding passing moral or 
political judgment. As suggested by the emphasis on narration, this form of historical writing 
tries to make the past accessible by recounting events in a story-like fashion that immerses the 
reader in the vivid minutiae of detail.35 The result is a form of historical consciousness that 
believes the stories of the past are, with the appropriate skill of retelling, comprehensible in 
themselves to the present. This means the historical record does not have to be framed as a 
self-conscious morality play and implies that the same events can be retold or re-used with a 
different narrative in the future as new information comes to light or a new perspective is added. 
Equally importantly, according to this form of historical consciousness, neither the present nor 
the future is considered to be at the mercy of how contemporaries appreciate and apply the 
significant lessons of history or else misconstrue or even misuse the symbols and stories of the 
past. This genre thus uses historical knowledge to bring the past to light both without 
instrumentalising it to provide lessons and without claiming that the past is at the mercy of 
present preoccupations.  
Thomas Carlyle is a supreme exemplar of this narrative genre, as the detail provided for 
his account of Marie-Antoinette’s execution demonstrates: 
At eleven, Marie-Antoinette was brought out. She had on an undress of piqué blanc: she 
was led to the place of execution, in the same manner as an ordinary criminal; bound, on 
a Cart; accompanied by a Constitutional Priest in Lay dress; escorted by numerous 
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detachments of infantry and cavalry ... On reaching the Place de la Révolution, her looks 
turned towards the Jardin National, whilom Tuileries; her face at that moment gave signs 
of lively emotion. She mounted the Scaffold with courage enough; at a quarter past 
Twelve, her head fell; the Executioner showed it to the people, amid universal long-
continued cries of Vive la République.36  
The eye-witness effect stands in sharp contrast with Edmund Burke’s superimposition of an 
astringent moral reading of the fate of the same tragic figure in accordance with the history as 
teacher genre. For Burke – who conceived of history as a ‘great volume unrolled for our 
instruction’37 – the death of the last French queen was indicative of something much broader 
and more repugnant than a moving tale of an unjust killing, namely that  
Never, never more, shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud 
submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, 
even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom! It is gone, that sensibility of 
principle, that chastity of honour, which felt a stain like a wound, which inspired courage 
whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice 
itself lost half its evil, by losing all its grossness.38 
Of course, the history as narrative genre does not preclude the ability to draw lessons from the 
many tragedies of fate and character littering the historical record, as Carlyle himself advocated 
in his lectures on heroes and hero-worship.39 However, the narrative tradition is based on a 
wager that the power of the story itself – the characters, the pathos, the denouement etc – 
triumphs over any formulaic message about relevance or moral guidance as with Simon 
Schama’s exhilarating retelling of the French Revolution.40 Indeed, the heyday of history as 
narrative, the early to mid-nineteenth century, provoked an academic reaction that placed a new 
disciplinary emphasis on rigour and scientific empiricism. This was the project of the German 
scholar Leopold von Ranke, who advocated the professionalization of the academic study of 
history based on primary documents, especially those recording the diplomatic relations of 
states.41 This attempted scientific revolution focused on determining history “as it really 
happened”, thereby explicitly foreswearing reflection on the nature of temporality and an 
associated purposive understanding of historical knowledge. Dissatisfaction with this 
unachievable neutral, atemporal treatment of the historical record, has led the mainstream of 
academic history in the twentieth century to rediscover a third genre of historical consciousness 
simultaneously more comfortable and critical in its purposive use of history: history as 
representation.  
History as Representation 
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The genre defined here as history as representation shares the tendency of history as 
narrative to treat the historical record as a palimpsest, where different meanings and portrayals 
can be superimposed on the same events. But what matters for history as representation is not 
the power of the story or the craft of its telling. Rather, this way of thinking about history 
challenges the present’s ability to represent the past by seeking to uncover the signs, symbols 
and even language that enable us to make sense of the past in its own terms as well as how 
these same elements have been used to represent a particular version of the past. This implies 
that the act of representing the past is in itself an inevitably political act whose genealogy needs 
to be laid bare. Hence the purpose behind this genre is to uncover precisely the genealogy 
underlying the contemporary use of the historical record. 
In comparison with history as teacher and history as narrative, therefore, history as 
representation fundamentally problematizes the present’s ability to understand the past – not in 
terms of the amount and quality of sources, as with von Ranke, but because of the changing as 
well as contested meaning and use of language, concepts and symbols. As a result, the 
ambition of this genre of historical consciousness is, unlike history as teacher, not to shape or 
even control the future. In this sense, it is an essentially critical rather than problem-solving 
approach to the study of history. That is, history as representation is critical about the 
contemporary misunderstanding and misuse of the past; if there are lessons to be learned from 
the past they are lessons about how easy it is to misrepresent the past.  
An early classic in this genre is undoubtedly Alexis de Tocqueville’s L’Ancien Régime et 
la Révolution (1856). Tocqueville’s critical enterprise in this study was to debunk the prevailing 
assumption that the French Revolution overturned the entire structure of political authority in 
France by placing popular sovereignty in the stead of feudalism and monarchy. Indeed, this 
notion of a revolutionary break was very much at the heart of political debate throughout 
Tocqueville’s lifetime, serving to polarize opinion between conservative reactionaries and 
defenders of an idealized republican movement. Yet this whole debate rested on a historical 
mistake, he argued. This was the result of an inability to understand the profoundly centralising 
tendencies of the last century of monarchical rule; a process that ironically provided a template 
for the revolutionaries who ostensibly sought to destroy the old order. Thus the claim that the 
revolution reshaped political authority by rooting out the old structures was precisely based, 
according to Tocqueville, on a misrepresentation of that old order. This error needed to be put 
right, for the sake of rescuing French politics from a self-destructive fallacy, by drawing on 
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previously unexamined and unheralded features of relations between local and central authority 
as expressed in various provincial administrative archives. 
To challenge misconceptions of the historical record, a high degree of magnification is 
needed; hence the recurring element of history as representation is a focus on the micro-level of 
historical actors and texts. A modern classic of this genre is Emmanuel Le Roy-Ladurie’s study 
Montaillou.42 This work used archival inquisition documents about the Cathar heresy to 
reconstruct a thirty-year period in the life of a medieval village in south-west France to 
demonstrate – against the prevailing view of a benighted medievalism and intolerant 
Catholicism – the complexity of how its inhabitants understood and experienced the 
fundamental aspects of daily life, religious experience and family relations. The micro-level of 
magnification characteristic of much history as representation need not be confined to 
individuals43. Quentin Skinner’s44 pioneering approach to the study of the history of political 
thought, based on a focus on language and speech acts contained in texts, thus follows history 
as representation by challenging earlier scholarship that detached (that is, misrepresented) 
political theorists from their historical context. 
This broad overview of the three genres of historical consciousness located in historical 
writing has concentrated on explaining how history as teacher, history as narrative and history 
as representation understand the question of temporality – the relationship between past, 
present and future – and how these different ways of thinking historically determine the purpose 
of producing historical knowledge. The first genre seeks to uncover the lessons of the past for 
the sake of improving present and future conduct; the second aims to provide a narrative that 
resonates dramatically but apolitically with the present and which may be told differently in the 
future; the third and final genre questions the ability to understand, let alone use, the past for 
present purposes, preferring instead to show the difficulties of understanding the past in its own 
terms. Turning next to historical consciousness as it is present in IR, the following section 
uncovers the implicit presence of differing genres of historical consciousness as found in 
mainstream traditions of thought in IR: lessons of history, revenge of history, and the possibility 
of a speculative escape from history.  
4. Genres of Historical Consciousness in IR Theory and the Purposes behind Them 
Whereas the dominant paradigms of IR theory are normally separated in relation to how 
they perceive the importance of anarchy and the ability to tame power via rules or institutions, 
this section argues that the traditions of realism and liberalism can also be distinguished in 
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terms of their understanding of temporality. In this way the genres of historical consciousness 
present in these traditions can thus be compared with those within historiography outlined 
above. In particular, the analysis claims that the existence of these genres reveals the inherently 
historical nature of IR theory – an enterprise that thinks historically by virtue of using historical 
knowledge purposively not just instructively. 
Lessons of History 
This genre of historical consciousness is present in the liberal tradition of IR theory, in 
particular in neoliberal institutionalism and democratic peace theory’s claims that theorizing 
international relations requires, to varying degrees, the assimilation of certain historical lessons 
about inter-state relations. These theoretical frameworks thus treat the historical past as 
inherently instructive, sharing an ambition to engage with history in order to draw the correct 
lessons that help contribute to understanding the present and – to the extent that lessons can 
be applied in practice – designing the future.  
What permeates neoliberal institutionalism is a concern with inter-state cooperation and 
how it can best be achieved so as to leave behind the pitfalls of anarchy. From this theoretical 
perspective, the history of institutions (supranational such as the UN, EU or WTO as well as 
their interaction with transnational actors such as NGOs or MNCs) reveals examples of why and 
under what conditions states cooperate. The purposive use of historical knowledge within this 
theoretical tradition is thus to provide positive lessons about successful cooperation yielding 
absolute or joint gains. Contrary to neorealist assumptions, neoliberal institutionalism shows that 
states are willing to forsake relative gains where the absolute gains are substantial and in 
multilateral cases that give rise to multiple equilibria. 45 The historical record is there precisely to 
provide a data set to test ‘the conditions under which institutions can have an impact and 
cooperation can occur’.46 In this context, the lesson of history is an inherently sanguine and 
policy-relevant one that ‘institutions appear essential if states are to have any hope of sustained 
cooperation, and of reaping its benefits.’47 
Neoliberal institutionalism also provides an account of when international institutions fail 
to have the desired effect of (sufficiently) taming state selfishness and enabling stable 
cooperation. Here the lesson of history is that international institutions are most successful 
when they act as autonomous agents capable of changing state preferences, as in the EU 
example, rather than as merely oversight mechanisms for binding rules, for instance the UN.48 
Moreover, the establishment of legal rules that give grounds for powerful transnational actors 
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such as NGOs and firms to litigate in both supranational and domestic courts is shown to 
facilitate the legalization of inter-state cooperation, thereby restraining states’ resort to unilateral 
measures and counter-measures.49 
The ability to learn how to transcend violent inter-state conflict, at least within a subset of 
certain states, is also part and parcel of liberalism in the shape of democratic peace theory. 
This, albeit highly contested, way of theorising inter-state relations and the reasons behind 
animosity or belligerence is again based on taking the right lessons from the historical record.50 
As with neoliberal institutionalism then, democratic peace theory is a theory that draws on the 
historical record to make and test claims about the nature of international politics, particularly 
processes of change. It is on this basis that they are treated as commensurate and comparable 
when it comes to their shared reliance on the same genre of historical consciousness.  
In the conceptual language of Kenneth Waltz, democratic peace is a ‘second image’ 
theory that identifies various features of the domestic political system to explain the nature of 
the resulting peaceful international relations between democratic states.51 These features 
include constitutional checks on executive power, electoral checks on bellicose politicians, 
political transparency and openness that enable credible commitments to be made to other 
states as well as the shared value of resolving disputes through routinized dialogue and 
negotiation. Moreover, given their transparency and checking mechanisms, domestic 
democratic systems are more amenable to the creation of institutions for pacific inter-state 
cooperation that become a mutually reinforcing mechanism for international peace.52  
Consequently, this theory of IR suggests that democratic states have succeeded in 
making an irreversible escape from a seeming intractable cyclical history of violent conflict. 
Peace via democracy is thus the key causal mechanism revealed by the history of inter-state 
relations – a claim that can already be found in Kant,53 who is traditionally taken as the 
intellectual progenitor of this theory. Indeed, for Kant, a state of “perpetual peace” – as opposed 
to an expanding separate peace between republics alone – is considered possible only after 
what he predicts will be “many unsuccessful attempts”. As explained by Doyle, what this means 
is that a globally operating liberal peace is itself necessarily a product of historical experience 
and learning: ‘right conceptions of the appropriate constitution, great and sad experience, and 
goodwill will have taught all the nations the lessons of peace’.54 Theorizing about history through 
the lens of democratic peace theory thus allows for the vindication of the particular institutional 
form, democracy, that can abolish the pathologies of inter-state competition, notably conflict 
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between autocracies and between liberal states and illiberal opponents. At the same time, 
democratic peace theory suggests that historical knowledge can be used to strive for 
implementing the conditions that will allow citizens of different states to avoid war. It is no 
surprise then to find a leading exponent of democratic peace theory such as Doyle arguing, 
during the Cold War, that ‘the violent lessons of war, and the experience of a partial peace 
[amongst democracies] are proof of the need for and the possibility of world peace’.55 There can 
be no more instructive use of history than this.  
Revenge of History 
At first glance, the realist tradition within IR theory appears to understand temporality 
according to the notion of history as teacher or lessons of history based on the longevity of the 
anarchic situation of international politics. That is, both classical and structural realists point to a 
historical continuity across their respective approaches. As espoused by John Mearsheimer, 
structural realism is well known for holding a ‘grim picture of world politics’ that is based on ‘at 
least 1200 years of staying power’.56 Similarly, Sten Rynning claims that classical realism has ‘a 
2,500-year track record of pondering tragedy and criticizing modernity’s blindness to its own 
capacity for destruction’57. However, the more deep-rooted genre of historical consciousness 
that manifests itself in the realist tradition is the tendency to conceive of the relationship 
between past, present, and future in terms of the “revenge of history” i.e. that state sovereignty 
under anarchy will always trump the best laid plans for constructing a rule based order. This is 
where realism can best be distinguished from liberalism in terms of temporality: it is a particular 
historical consciousness within realism that is used to justify scepticism about the liberal idea 
that anarchy can be transcended or that institutions and associated rules of order can tame the 
exercise of power.  
Classical realism presents this element of revenge in an axiomatic form – or even an 
Augustinian sense of the impossibility of escaping from original sin58 – although, as discussed 
below, there are some grounds for constructing a progressive version of this theoretical 
framework at odds with a revenge of history understanding of temporality. By contrast, 
neorealism realism couches its pessimistic conception of history in the idiom of positivist social 
science, using the notion of the anarchic structure of international politics to theorize the 
impossibility of escaping from contingent inter-state behaviour. The result is that realism is 
united in having a historically-based critique of liberal notions of improving inter-state relations. 
Understood in terms of temporality, the structural realist worldview posits that the past 
will always be relevant and cannot be escaped, as captured in claims Mearsheimer made in 
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1990 that the post-Cold War era would make Europe more conflict-prone and unstable than 
under bipolarity.59 In this way structural realism, alongside its critique of the causal claims of 
both democratic peace theory and neoliberal institutionalism, rejects the notion that history can 
be used didactically to improve inter-state relations. For structural realists such as Waltz or 
Mearsheimer, the absence of a hierarchical arrangement, akin to a world government, 
constraining inter-state behaviour means that neither domestic institutional structures nor 
international organizations can have a decisive and independent impact on how states behave. 
In this context, the revenge of history is such that policies based on contrary assumptions ‘are 
bound to fail’; there is no meaningful scope for using historical learning to improve inter-state 
relations that can make the present different from the past. Hence structural realists’ forward-
looking predictions are inherently pessimistic: ‘misplaced reliance on institutional solutions is 
likely to lead to more failures in the future’.60 
In the specific case of European integration, the founder of neo-realism Kenneth Waltz 
argued that this instance of supranational innovation – a blueprint designed to pacify inter-state 
relations – was only viable because security concerns were delegated to NATO.61 More 
recently, Sebastian Rosato has tried to explain the anomaly of integration using an argument 
that explained why this process was a historical anomaly that ineluctable forces would undo. He 
posits that the extraordinary disparity in postwar power on the continent between Western 
Europe and the Soviet Union drove the countries of the former to take the extraordinary step of 
‘integrating their economies’ in the 1950s.62 Cooperation in the economic sphere was, from this 
perspective, a long-term strategy intended to overcome a three-to-one power deficit in military 
terms. In doing so, West European states were creating the economic conditions necessary to 
provide the material and technological strength to resist potential Soviet aggression. ‘The 
Europeans’, Rosato argues, ‘understood that they could compete effectively only if they built a 
single regional economy governed by a central authority’.63 
It is precisely this logic that then leads to the claim that the contemporary absence of an 
external threat equates to the stagnation of integration, notably the failure of the project to 
endow the EU with a constitutional foundation. This controversial64 causal argument gives rise 
to a set of pessimistic conclusions about the revenge of inescapable historical drivers of inter-
state behaviour. Most importantly, it suggests that full-blown political and security integration is 
not possible in the absence of external compulsion. Consequently, an ideological commitment 
by elites or else a self-interested desire for more integration from national economic interests is 
insufficient to generate deeper integration. In fact, the ‘collapse of the Soviet Union has meant 
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that the Europeans have not had a compelling geopolitical reason to preserve their economic 
community’.65  
This conceit that history will have its revenge on the best-laid plans of policy planners is 
also a running thread through classical realism. As with Mearsheimer, European security is a 
privileged field for classical realists that share a revengeful vision of history precisely because of 
the political aspirations to construct institutional arrangements that can leave behind warfare 
and antagonism on that continent. However, E.H. Carr was a critic of federal designs in post-
war Europe on the basis that it would re-create chauvinistic nationalism on a wider scale, 
something that only an admixture of national and functional international agencies could 
resolve.66 From this classical realist perspective, Carr argued, ‘there would be little cause for 
congratulations in a division of the world into a small number of large multi-national units 
exercising control over vast territories and practicing in competition and conflict with one another 
a new imperialism which would be simply the old nationalism writ large and would almost 
certainly pave the way for more titanic and more devastating wars’.67 
A similar, pessimistic message about the futility of expecting institutions to solve 
problems inherent to mankind’s social organization can be seen in Lindley-French’s criticism of 
the EU’s attempts to coordinate foreign policy. Comparing the Common Security and Defence 
Policy to earlier historical attempts to resolve continental inter-state relations, he notes that 
today ‘European leaders lack either the ingenuity or the clarity to know how to use [power]’.68 In 
other words, the successful restraint of power is based on the existing of enlightened statesmen 
able to grasp the subtleties of the great game – as in the Concert of Europe – and not on the 
fetishization of institutions as ends in their own right. The historical consciousness of classical 
realism thus explains why the architecture of EU security today can be compared to the dead-
letter Locarno Treaty.  
 
The Speculative Possibility of an Escape from History 
 
Revenge of history found in varieties of realism, therefore, does not place history or 
historical methods on a pedestal for their own sake. Rather, the historical record is used 
purposively to demonstrate the futility of imagining a perfectibility based on assimilating lessons 
from the conduct of states or the operation of institutions they have designed together. The 
reasoning behind structural realism’s rejection of the lessons of history genre of historical 
consciousness stems from the post-war intellectual project it derives from. That project, 
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exemplified by Hans Morgenthau’s attempt to develop a theory of power politics, was supposed 
to thwart the behaviouralist, scientific and inherently liberal turn in IR. Morgenthau and his 
acolytes believed the scientific turn in American political science was merely old wine in new 
bottles because it shared ‘the same utopian drive that characterized the legalist vision of the 
interwar years’.69 This principle united Morgenthau, who mocked the idea ‘that man is able to 
legislate at will’,70 with Reinhald Niebuhr, who saw the new science of inter-state behaviour as 
predicated on the assumption that ‘men [have] mastery over their historical fate’.71 Yet despite 
the Augustinian underpinnings of twentieth-century classical realism – which posits as a 
foundational historical constant that all humans, by extension, all states are morally flawed and 
prone to immoral acts – these authors also recognised another possible notion of temporality in 
place of revenge of history. 
 In a more speculative than explanatory guise,72 both Niebuhr and Morgenthau explored 
the possibility of a fundamental caesura in the history of international relations that makes the 
present very much unlike the past, in the process hypothesizing that the conditions were ripe for 
an unprecedented development in human history: a world government. From this perspective, 
the history of relations between states reveals the possibility of a novel need to establish an 
order that can triumph over the imperfections caused by the division of the globe into sovereign 
states. Rather than embracing the pure scepticism of thinking historically in terms of the 
revenge of history, Niebuhr – the most important mid-twentieth-century progressive realist –
during World War Two already saw the desirability of a global federal system. This belief was 
greatly reinforced by the development of the atomic bomb, with the nuclear revolution in fact 
making a world state a logical necessity in order to avoid the nuclear holocaust that a flawed 
humanity would most probably provoke. What Niebuhr and Morgenthau grappled with, 
therefore, was whether the very nature of international politics had changed, making the lessons 
or the revenge of the past equally inapplicable. 
Importantly, any potential global escape from history was conceived of by these classical 
realists as the product of an evolutionary process and not couched in terms of a concrete 
institutional blueprint based on lessons of history. The new leviathan they envisioned existed 
only as a glimmer of hope that was realisable not by rational design but by potentially embracing 
the facts of thermonuclear warfare before it actually became a reality – hence the need to 
escape from this particular kind of historical possibility that threatened civilization itself. 
Speculation about a temporal sequence in which the future was separated out from the 
dynamics of past and present thus centred around the social and cultural basis for a world state, 
especially one that could avoid an authoritarian logic. For Niebuhr, the conditions for leaving 
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behind existing history were vague and related to global social integration and cohesion.73 
Similarly, Morgenthau, in the first edition of Politics Among Nations, used vague formulations to 
argue that ‘If the world state is unattainable in our world, yet indispensable for the survival of 
that world, it is necessary to create the conditions under which it will not be impossible from the 
outset to establish a world state’.74 These “conditions” he went on to claim, relate to international 
diplomacy, an essentially practical field or craft rather than a cumulative empirical science in 
which the lessons of history can be applied. Hence this evolutionary understanding of the 
possibility for a fundamental caesura in international politics remained a fundamentally 
speculative, rather than an analytically profound, genre of historical consciousness.  
 
  
5. Conclusions 
This article stands squarely in the tradition of problematizing both the notion of historical 
understanding, as has occurred in the discipline of history itself,75 and the assumed disciplinary 
divide between history and IR.76 However, existing attempts to promote disciplinary dialogue 
between history and IR have underestimated the significance of thinking historically within and 
across the disciplines. The explanation offered here as to why this is the case is twofold: the 
narrow focus of IR scholars on epistemological debates within historiography that followed the 
attempted positivist turn and a focus on the history as teacher, and its analogue lessons of 
history, genre  of historical consciousness. To engage with earlier historiographical debates 
concerning the purpose of historical knowledge production the article explored a broader swathe 
of the Western canon of historiography, to reveal how historians have been divided by their 
understanding of the nature of temporality.  
It is precisely these competing notions of temporality, as argued in section 3, that 
fundamentally affect historians’ understanding of what the study of history is for, that is, the 
purpose behind linking together past, present, and future. By extension the presence of these or 
similar genres of historical consciousness needed to make sense of temporality has been 
overlooked when discussing the relationship between mainstream traditions of thought in IR and 
history. Yet as was shown in section 4, different genres of historical consciousness are present 
across various strands of mainstream IR theory. Those identified in this article – lessons of 
history, revenge of history, and a more speculative notion of an escape from history – are not 
the same as those present in the discipline of history, thereby illustrating a divide over how 
temporality is understood. Nevertheless, the presence of different genres of historical 
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consciousness across both disciplines corresponds with their different purposive enterprises, 
further revealing the artificiality of the nomothetic/idiographic divide by showing that history is 
not simply the study of the past for its own sake.77  
The shift advocated here to move away from “doing history” to thinking historically is 
thus not intended to provide methodological pointers but rather to explore what still separates IR 
and history when it comes to thinking historically. Distinctions in how the disciplines think 
historically point to different ways of thinking historically that can also potentially inspire 
intellectual cross-pollination. History as teacher, of course, bears a striking resemblance to the 
lessons of history genre that claims historical understanding is needed, if not to improve the 
present and future, then at least to avoid mistakes that could make things worse. But this 
instructive approach to history is not the only way that IR theory can think historically, just as 
historiography has concerns beyond moral or political improvement. Significantly, revenge of 
history does not seem to have an equivalent in the historical profession, just as history as 
narrative does not have an analogue in mainstream paradigms of IR theory. It is an open 
question as to how far IR theory can think historically along the lines of history as 
representation, that is, with an understanding of temporality that problematizes the ability to 
access the past. This way of thinking poses an inherent challenge to democratic peace theory 
and neoliberal institutionalism as they assume the commensurability of past and present, 
suggesting perhaps that this genre of historical consciousness has a more natural application 
outside the mainstream, with Herbert Butterfield’s treatment of the historical record as 
incomplete, permitting only interim knowledge, providing a clue as to the possibilities therein.78  
Furthermore, the contrast between liberalism and realism showed the complexity of how 
temporality is understood within the latter paradigm and provides another conceptual starting 
point for distinguishing between these two “isms”. The existence of different genres of historical 
consciousness within realism can also function to capture the split between realists that lies not 
in the origin of anarchy itself – human nature or exogenous structure – but in how realists think 
historically. While classical and structural realists might agree that history is instructive in a 
negative fashion that confounds hopes of simple lesson-learning, this article has shown that the 
former envisage not just a revenge of history but a potential escape from it. In this context, 
realism appears torn between two different ways of critiquing the assumption that historical 
knowledge provides an instructive toolkit that allows for improved inter-state relations.  
What emerges, therefore, from this juxtaposition of genres of historical consciousness 
across the two disciplines is the extent to which mainstream paradigms of IR theory are 
predisposed to thinking historically. Not only is IR dependent on historical data – however 
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problematic its use may be in practice – provided by history; liberalism and realism are also 
fundamentally engaged in reflecting on the nature of temporality. Historical consciousness thus 
runs through both IR theory and historiography, albeit in different ways. More fundamentally, the 
analysis revealed the inherently purposive use of historical knowledge across both disciplines. 
However, this conclusion further implies that productive disciplinary dialogue needs to look 
beyond the question of “doing history” to consider also how to think historically in terms of 
different understandings of temporality. In particular, as shown by an analysis of the differing 
presence of historical consciousness across both history and IR, a comparative examination of 
understandings of temporality – requiring engagement with a broad swathe of historiography – 
is a promising gambit for exploring this dimension of the disciplinary dialogue. 
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